Abstract. Several recent studies in privacy-preserving learning have considered the trade-o between utility or risk and the level of dierential privacy guaranteed by mechanisms for statistical query processing. In this paper we study this trade-o in private Support Vector Machine (SVM) learning. We present two ecient mechanisms, one for the case of nite-dimensional feature mappings and one for potentially innite-dimensional feature mappings with translation-invariant kernels. For the case of translation-invariant kernels, the proposed mechanism minimizes regularized empirical risk in a random Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space whose kernel uniformly approximates the desired kernel with high probability. This technique, borrowed from large-scale learning, allows the mechanism to respond with a nite encoding of the classier, even when the function class is of innite VC dimension. Dierential privacy is established using a proof technique from algorithmic stability. Utilitythe mechanism's response function is pointwise -close to non-private SVM with probability 1 − δis proven by appealing to the smoothness of regularized empirical risk minimization with respect to small perturbations to the feature mapping. We conclude with a lower bound on the optimal dierential privacy of the SVM. This negative result states that for any δ, no mechanism can be simultaneously ( , δ)-useful and β-dierentially private for small and small β.
Introduction
The goal of a well-designed statistical database is to provide aggregate information about a database's entries while maintaining individual entries' privacy. These two goals of utility and privacy are inherently discordant. For a mechanism to be useful, its responses must closely resemble some target statistic of the database's entries. However to protect privacy, it is often necessary for the mechanism's response distribution to be`smoothed out', i.e., the mechanism must be randomized to reduce the individual entries' inuence on this distribution. It has been of key interest to the statistical database community to understand when the goals of utility and privacy can be eciently achieved simultaneously (Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Barak et al., 2007; Blum et al., 2008; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Kasiviswanathan et al., 2008) .
In this paper we consider the practical goal of private regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) in Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Spaces for the special case of the Support Vector Machine (SVM). We adopt the strong notion of dierential privacy as formalized by Dwork (2006) . Our ecient new mechanisms are shown to parametrize functions that are close to non-private SVM under the L ∞ -norm, with high probability. In our setting this notion of utility is stronger than closeness of risk (cf. Remark 3).
We employ a number of algorithmic and proof techniques new to dierential privacy. One of our new mechanisms borrows a technique from large-scale learning, in which regularized ERM is performed in a random feature space whose inner-product uniformly approximates the target feature space inner-product.
This random feature space is constructed by viewing the target kernel as a probability measure in the Fourier domain. This technique enables the nite parametrization of responses from function classes with innite VC dimension. To establish utility, we show that regularized ERM is relatively insensitive to perturbations of the kernel: not only does the technique of learning in a random RKHS enable nitely-encoded privacypreserving responses, but these responses well-approximate the responses of non-private SVM. Together these two techniques may prove useful in extending privacy-preserving mechanisms to learn in large function spaces. To prove dierential privacy, we borrow a proof technique from the area of algorithmic stability. We believe that stability may become a fruitful avenue for constructing new private mechanisms in the future, based on learning maps presently known to be stable. Of particular interest, is the optimal dierential privacy of the SVM, which loosely speaking is the best level of privacy achievable by any accurate mechanism for SVM learning. Through our privacy-preserving mechanisms for the SVM, endowed with guarantees of utility, we upper bound optimal dierential privacy.
We also provide lower bounds on the SVM's optimal dierential privacy, which are impossibility results for simultaneously achieving high levels of utility and privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After concluding this section with a summary of related work, we recall basic concepts of dierential privacy and SVM learning in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 describe the new mechanisms for private SVM learning for nite-dimensional feature maps and (potentially innite-dimensional) feature maps with translation-invariant kernels. Each mechanism is accompanied with proofs of privacy and utility bounds. Section 5 considers the special case of hinge loss and presents an upper bound on the SVM's optimal dierential privacy. A corresponding lower bound is then given in Section 6.
We conclude the paper with several open problems.
1.1. Related Work. There is a rich literature of prior work on dierential privacy in the theory community.
The following sections summarize work related to our own, organized to contrast this work with our main contributions.
1.1.1. Range Spaces Parametrizing Vector-Valued Statistics or Functions with Finite VC-dimension. Early work on private interactive mechanisms focused on approximating real-and vector-valued statistics (e.g., Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Blum et al., 2005; Dwork, 2006; Barak et al., 2007) . rst considered private mechanisms with range spaces parametrizing sets more general than real-valued vectors, and used such dierentially private mappings for mechanism design. More related to our work are the private mechanisms for regularized logistic regression proposed and analyzed by Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009) . There the mechanism's range space parametrizes the VC-dimension d + 1 class of linear hyperplanes in R d . Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) showed that discretized concept classes can be PAC learned or agnostically learned privately, albeit via an inecient mechanism. Blum et al. (2008) showed that non-interactive mechanisms can privately release anonymized data such that utility is guaranteed over classes of predicate queries with polynomial VC dimension, when the domain is discretized. more recently characterized when utility and privacy can be achieved by ecient non-interactive mechanisms. In this paper we consider ecient mechanisms for private SVM learning, whose range spaces parametrize real-valued functions (whose sign form trained classiers). One case covered by our analysis is learning with a Gaussian kernel, which corresponds to learning over a class of innite VC dimension.
1.1.2. Practical Privacy-Preserving Learning (Mostly) via Subset-Sums. Most prior work in dierential privacy has focused on the deep analysis of mechanisms for relatively simple statistics (with histograms and contingency tables as explored by Blum et al. 2005 and Barak et al. 2007 respectively, as examples) and learning algorithms (e.g., interval queries and half-spaces as explored by Blum et al. 2008) , or on constructing learning algorithms that can be decomposed into subset-sum operations (e.g., perceptron, k-NN, ID3 as described by Blum et al. 2005 , and various recommender systems due to the work of McSherry and Mironov 2009) . By contrast, we consider the practical goal of SVM learning, which does not decompose into subsetsums. It is also notable that our mechanisms run in polynomial time. The most related work to our own in this regard is due to Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009) , although their results hold only for dierentiable loss, and nite feature mappings.
1.1.3. The Privacy-Utility Trade-O. Like several prior studies, we consider the trade-o between privacy and utility. Barak et al. (2007) presented a mechanism for releasing contingency tables that guarantees dierential privacy and also guarantees a notion of accuracy: with high probability all marginals from the released table are close in L 1 -norm to the true table's marginals. As mentioned above, Blum et al. (2008) developed a private non-interactive mechanism that releases anonymized data such that all predicate queries in a VC-class take on similar values on the anonymized data and original data. In the work of Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) , utility corresponds to PAC learning: with high probability the response and target concepts are close, averaged over the underlying measure.
A sequence of prior negative results have shown that any mechanism providing overly accurate responses cannot be private (Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Dwork and Yekhanin, 2008) . Dinur and Nissim (2003) showed that if noise of rate only o( √ n) is added to subset sum queries on a database of bits then an adversary can reconstruct a 1 − o(1) fraction of the database. This is a threshold phenomenon that says if accuracy is too small, privacy cannot be guaranteed at all. This result was more recently extended to allow for mechanisms that answer a small fraction of queries arbitrarily . We show a similar negative result for the private SVM setting: any mechanism that is too accurate with respect to the SVM cannot guarantee strong levels of privacy.
1.1.4. Connections between Stability, Robust Statistics, and Global Sensitivity. To prove dierential privacy, we borrow a proof technique from the area of algorithmic stability. In passing Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) note the similarity between notions of algorithmic stability and dierential privacy, however do not exploit this. The connection between algorithmic stability and dierential privacy is qualitatively similar to the recent work of Dwork and Lei (2009) 
The probability in the denition is over the randomization in M . For continuous T M we mean by this ratio a Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distribution of M (D 1 ) with respect to the distribution of M (D 2 ). If an adversary knows M and the rst n − 1 entries of D, she may simulate the mechanism with dierent choices for the missing example. If the mechanism's response distribution varies smoothly with her choice, the adversary will not be able to infer the true value of entry n by querying M . In the sequel we assume WLOG that each pair of neighboring databases dier on their last entry.
Intuitively the more an`interesting' 1 mechanism M is perturbed to guarantee dierential privacy, the less like M the resulting mechanismM will become. The next denition formalizes the notion of`likeness'. Denition 2. Consider two mechanismsM and M with the same domain and response spaces TM , T M respectively. Let X be some set and let F be a space of real-valued functions on X that is parametrized by the response spaces: for every t ∈ TM ∪ T M let f t ∈ F be some function. Finally assume F is endowed with norm · F . Then for > 0 and 0 < δ < 1 we say that 2M is ( , δ)-useful with respect to M if, for all
TypicallyM will be a privacy-preserving version of M , that has been perturbed somehow. Usefulness means that not only doesM guarantee privacy of the training database, but that the aggregate information revealed about the database byM is`close' to what would be revealed by the desired (but non-private) mechanism M . In the sequel we will take · F to be the sup-norm over a subset M ⊆ R d containing the data, which we denote by f ∞;M = sup x∈M |f (x)|. It will also be convenient to use the notation k ∞;M = sup x,y∈M |k(x, y)| for bivariate functions k(·, ·).
Remark 3. In the sequel we develop privacy-preserving mechanisms that are useful with respect to the Support Vector Machine (see the next section for a brief introduction to the SVM). The SVM works to minimize the expected hinge-loss (i.e., risk in terms of the hinge-loss), which is a convex surrogate for the expected 0-1 loss. Since the hinge-loss is Lipschitz in the real-valued function output by the SVM, it follows that a mechanismM having utility with respect to the SVM also has expected hinge-loss that is within 1 Examples of interesting properties include low risk, robustness to a small amount of malicious noise, etc.
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Note that we have chosen to overload the term ( , δ)-usefulness introduced by Blum et al. (2008) for non-interactive mechanisms that release anonymized data. Our denition of usefulness is analogous for the present setting of privacy-preserving learning, where a single function is released. We will see that the presented analysis does not simultaneously guarantee privacy at arbitrary levels and utility at arbitrary accuracy. The highest level of privacy guaranteed over all ( , δ)-useful mechanisms with respect to a target mechanism M , is quantied by the optimal dierential privacy for M . We dene this notion for the SVM here, but the concept extends to any target mechanism of interest. We present upper and lower bounds on β( , δ, C, n, , k) for the SVM in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
Denition 4. For , C > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), n > 1, loss function (y,ŷ) convex inŷ, and kernel k, the optimal dierential privacy for the SVM is the function
where I is the set of all ( , δ)-useful mechanisms with respect to the SVM with parameter C, loss , and kernel k; and D is the set of all pairs of neighboring databases with n entries. 
where the x i ∈ R d are training input points and the y i ∈ {−1, 1} are their training labels, n is the size of the training set, φ :
F is a feature mapping taking points in input space R d to some (possibly innite)
F -dimensional feature space, (y,ŷ) is a loss function convex inŷ, and w is a hyperplane normal vector in feature space.
When F is nite, predictions are made by taking the sign of f (x) = f w (x) = φ(x), w . We will refer to both f w (·) and sgn (f w (·)) as classiers, with the exact meaning apparent from the context. When F is large and when inner-products in feature space may be computed quickly via an explicit representation of the 
More generally, the Support Vector Machine can be seen as performing regularized ERM in a Reproducing
Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) H. The Representer Theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba, 1971) states that the minimizing f = arg min f ∈H
lies in the span of the functions k(·, x i ) ∈ H. Indeed the above dual expansion shows that the coordinates in this subspace are given by the α i y i .
We dene the mechanism SVM to be the dual optimization that responds with the vector α , as described by Algorithm 1. For general information about SVMs see e.g., (Burges, 1998; Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000; Schölkopf and Smola, 2001; Bishop, 2006) . We end this section with the denition of an important class of kernels (see Table 1 for examples).
Denition 5. A kernel function of the form k(x, y) = g(x − y), for some function g, is called translationinvariant. 
Mechanism for Finite Feature Maps
As a rst step towards private SVM learning we begin by considering the simple case of nite Fdimensional feature maps. Algorithm 2 describes the PrivateSVM-Finite mechanism, which follows the usual pattern of preserving dierential privacy: after forming the primal solution to the SVMan F -dimensional vectorthe mechanism adds Laplace-distributed noise to the weight vector. Guaranteeing dierential privacy proceeds via the usual two-step process of calculating the L 1 -sensitivity of the SVM's weight vector, then showing that β-dierential privacy follows from sensitivity together with the choice of Laplace noise with scale equal to sensitivity divided by β.
To calculate sensitivity, we exploit the algorithmic stability of regularized ERM. Intuitively, stability corresponds to continuity of a learning map. Several notions of stability are known to lead to good generalization error bounds (Devroye and Wagner, 1979; Kearns and Ron, 1999; Bousquet and Elissee, 2002; Kutin and Niyogi, 2002) , sometimes in cases where class capacity-based approaches such as VC theory do not apply. A learning map A is a function that maps a database D to a classier f D ; it is precisely the composition of a mechanism followed by the classier parametrization mapping. Lemma 6. Consider loss function (y,ŷ) that is dierentiable, convex and L-Lipschitz inŷ, and an RKHS H induced by nite F -dimensional feature mapping φ with bounded norm
be the minimizer of the following regularized empirical risk function for each database
Then for every pair of neighboring databases D, D of n entries,
Proof. For convenience we dene R emp (w, S) = n
where ∂ w is the partial derivative operator with respect to w. Dene the auxiliary risk functioñ
It is easy to see thatR(w) is strictly convex in w and thatR(w D ) = 0. And since by Equation (3.2)
For example an SVM mechanism may return a weight vector w or dual coecients α which in turn parametrizes the classier f . The SVM learning map takes the training database directly to the classier.
Algorithm 2 PrivateSVM-Finite
induced kernel k; convex loss function ; and parameters λ, C > 0.
(1) α ← Run Algorithm 1 on D with parameter C, kernel k, and loss ;
. sample of F scalars from Laplace (0, λ); and (4) Returnŵ =w + µ it follows thatR(w) is minimized at w D by Equation (3.1). ThusR(w D ) ≤ 0. Next simplify the rst term ofR(w D ), scaled by n/C for simplicity:
where (y,ŷ) = ∂ŷ (y,ŷ). The second equality follows from ∂ w (y, f w (x)) = (y, f w (x)) φ(x) and x i = x i and y i = y i for each i ∈ [n − 1], and the inequality follows from the dierentiability and convexity 4 of inŷ.
by the Lipschitz continuity of . Now by the reproducing property and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we can upper bound the classier dierence's innity norm by the Euclidean norm on the weight vectors: for each
Combining this with Inequality (3.
With the weight vector's sensitivity in hand, dierential privacy follows immediately from the proof technique established by .
Theorem 7 (Privacy of PrivateSVM-Finite). For any β > 0, database D of size n, C > 0, loss function (y,ŷ) that is convex and L-Lipschitz inŷ, and nite F -dimensional feature map with kernel
and regularization parameter C guarantees β-dierential privacy.
This rst main result establishes the usual kind of dierential privacy guarantee for the new PrivateSVMFinite algorithm. The more private the data, the more noise must be added. The more entries in the database, the less noise is needed to achieve the same level of privacy. Since the noise vector µ has exponential tails, standard tail bound inequalities quickly lead to ( , δ)-usefulness for PrivateSVM-Finite. 4 Namely for dierentiable convex f and any a, , and regularization parameter C, is ( , δ)-useful with respect to the SVM under the · ∞;M -norm. Proof. Our goal is to compare the SVM and PrivateSVM-Finite classications of any point x ∈ M:
The absolute value of a zero mean Laplace random variable with scale parameter λ is exponentially distributed with scale λ −1 . Moreover the sum of q i.i.d. exponential random variables has Erlang q-distribution with the same scale parameter.
5 Thus we have, for Erlang F -distributed random variable X and any t > 0,
Here we have employed the standard Cherno tail bound technique using Markov's inequality. The numerator of (3.4), the moment generating function of the Erlang F -distribution with parameter λ, is (1 − λt)
−F for all t < λ −1 . Together with the choice of t = (2λ)
= exp (F log e 2 − /(2λΦ)) .
And provided that λ ≤ / 2Φ F log e 2 + log e 1 δ this probability is bounded by δ.
Our second main result establishes that PrivateSVM-Finite is not only dierentially private, but that it releases a classier that is similar to the SVM. Utility and privacy are competing properties, however, since utility demands that the noise not be too large.
Mechanism for Translation-Invariant Kernels
Consider now the problem of privately learning in an RKHS H induced by an innite dimensional feature mapping φ. As a mechanism's response must be nitely encodable, the primal parametrization seems less appealing as it did in PrivateSVM-Finite. It is natural to look to the SVM's dual solution as a starting point: the Representer Theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba, 1971) states that the optimizing f ∈ H must be in the span of the dataa nite-dimensional subspace. While the coordinates in this subspacethe α i dual variablescould be perturbed in the usual way to guarantee dierential privacy, the subspace's basis the dataare also needed to parametrize f . To side-step this apparent stumbling block, we take another approach by approximating H with a random RKHSĤ induced by a random nite-dimensional mapφ. This then allows us to respond with a nite primal parametrization. Algorithm 3 summarizes the PrivateSVM mechanism.
As noted recently by Rahimi and Recht (2008) , the Fourier transform p of the g function of a continuous positive-denite translation-invariant kernel is a non-negative measure (Rudin, 1994) . Rahimi and Recht
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The Erlang q-distribution has density
, expectation qλ and variance qλ 2 .
Algorithm 3 PrivateSVM
Inputs: 
(4.1)
Inner-products in the random feature space approximate k(·, ·) uniformly, and to arbitrary precision depending on parameterd, as restated in Lemma 13. We denote the inner-product in the random feature space byk. Rahimi and Recht (2008) applied this approximation to large-scale learning (situations where n is large). Instead of employing non-linear SVM's dual solution which takes O(n 2 ) time, the primal solution to linear SVM onφ is used, as it takes time quadratic ind to compute. For large-scale learning, good approximations can be found ford n. As with the SVM and PrivateSVM-Finite, the response of Algorithm 3 can be used to make classications on future test points by constructing the classierf (·) = fŵ(·) = ŵ,φ(·) . Unlike the previous mechanisms, however, PrivateSVM must include a parametrization of feature mapφthe sample {ρ i }d i=1 in its response. Of PrivateSVM's total response, onlyŵ depends on database D. The ρ i are data-independent vectors drawn from the transform p of the kernel, which we assume to be known by the adversary (to wit the adversary knows the mechanism itself, including k). Thus to establish dierential privacy we need only consider the data-dependent weight vector, fortunately we have already considered the similar case of PrivateSVM-Finite. This result is surprising, in that PrivateSVM is able to guarantee privacy for regularized ERM over a function class of innite VC-dimension, where the obvious way to return the learned classier (responding with the dual variables and feature mapping) reveals all the entries corresponding to the support vectors, completely.
Like PrivateSVM-Finite, PrivateSVM is useful with respect to the SVM. If we denote the function parametrized by intermediate weight vectorw byf , then the same argument for the utility of PrivateSVMFinite establishes the high-probability proximity off and f .
Lemma 10. Consider a run of Algorithms 1 and 3 withd ∈ N, C > 0, convex loss and translation-invariant kernel. Denote byf andf the classiers parametrized by weight vectorsŵ andw respectively, where these vectors are related byŵ =w + µ with µ iid ∼ Laplace(0, λ) in Algorithm 3. For any > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if 0 < λ ≤ min 2 4 log e 2 √d ,
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 8 we can use the Cherno trick to show that, for Erlang 2d-distributed random variable X, the choice of t = (2λ) −1 ,and for any > 0
then the claim follows.
To show a similar result for f andf , we exploit smoothness of the regularized ERM with respect to small changes in the RKHS itself. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of stability to the feature mapping has not been used before. We begin with a technical lemma that we will use to exploit the convexity of the regularized empirical risk functional.
Lemma 11. Let R be a functional on Hilbert space
Proof. By assumption and the antecedent
Taking square roots of both sides yields the consequent.
Provided that the kernel functions k andk are uniformly close, the next lemma exploits insensitivity of regularized ERM to perturbations of the feature mapping to show that f andf are pointwise close.
Lemma 22 re-proves this result for non-dierentiable loss functions.
Lemma 12. Let H be an RKHS with translation-invariant kernel k, and letĤ be the random RKHS corresponding to feature map (4.1) induced by k. Let C be a positive scalar and loss (y,ŷ) be dierentiable, convex, and L-Lipschitz inŷ. Consider the regularized empirical risk minimizers in each RKHS
be any set containing x 1 , . . . , x n . For any > 0, if the dual variables from both optimizations have L 1 -norms bounded by some Λ > 0 and k −k
Proof. Denote the empirical risk functional by
2 /2, for the appropriate RKHS norm (either H orĤ). Let f denote the regularized empirical risk minimizer in H, given by parameter vector α , and let g denote the regularized empirical risk minimizer inĤ given by parameter vector β . Let g α = n i=1 α i y iφ (x i ) and f β = n i=1 β i y i φ(x i ) denote the images of f and g under the natural mapping between the spans of the data in RKHS'sĤ and H respectively. We will rst show that these four functions have arbitrarily close regularized empirical risk in their respective RKHS, and then that this implies uniform proximity of the functions themselves. First observe that for any g ∈Ĥ
The inequality follows from the convexity of R emp [·]; the subsequent equality by
the third equality by ∂ g RĤ reg [g ] = 0; and the remainder by gathering terms. With this, Lemma 11 states that for any g ∈Ĥ and > 0,
Next we will show that the antecedent is true for g = g α . Conditioned on k −k
by the bound on α 1 . This and the Lipschitz continuity of the loss leads to
This combines with Inequality (4.4) to yield
Together with Inequality (4.3) this nally implies that f − g ∞;M ≤ Λ + 2 (CL + Λ/2) Λ , con- We now recall the result due to Rahimi and Recht (2008) that establishes the non-asymptotic uniform convergence of the kernel functions required by the previous Lemma (i.e., an upper bound on the probability of event A ).
Lemma 13 Proof. Lemma's 12 and 10 combined via the triangle inequality, with Lemma 13, together establish the result as follows. Dene A to be the conditioning event regarding the approximation of k byk, denote the events in Lemma's 12 and 8 by B and C (beware we are overloading C with the regularization parameter; its meaning will be apparent from the context), and the target event in the theorem by D.
The claim is a bound on Pr(D). By the triangle inequality events B and C together imply D. Second note that event C is independent of A and B. Again we see that utility and privacy place competing constraints on the level of noise λ. Next we will use these interactions to upper-bound the optimal dierential privacy of the SVM.
Hinge-Loss and an Upper Bound on Optimal Differential Privacy
We begin by`plugging' hinge loss (y,ŷ) = (1 − yŷ) + into the main results on privacy and utility of the previous section (similar computations can be done for PrivateSVM-Finite and other convex loss functions). The following is the dual formulation of hinge-loss SVM learning: Proof. The rst result follows from Theorem 7 and the fact that hinge-loss is convex and 1-Lipschitz on R:
i.e., ∂ŷ = 1[1 ≥ yŷ] ≤ 1. The second result follows almost immediately from Theorem 14. For hinge-loss we have that feasible α i 's are bounded by C/n (and so Λ = C) by the dual's box constraints and that L = 1, implying we take θ( ) = min 1,
. This is bounded by the stated θ( ).
Combining the competing requirements on noise level λ upper-bounds optimal dierential privacy of hinge-loss SVM. Theorem 16. The optimal dierential privacy for hinge-loss SVM learning on translation-invariant kernel
Proof. Consider hinge loss in Corollary 15. Privacy places a lower bound of β ≥ 2 2.5 C d /(λn) for any chosen λ, which we can convert to a lower bound on β in terms of and δ as follows. For small , we have θ( ) = 4 2 −12 C −4 and so to achieve ( , δ)-usefulness we must taked = O A natural question arises from this discussion: given any mechanism that is ( , δ)-useful with respect to hinge SVM, for how small a β can we possibly hope to guarantee β-dierential privacy? In other words, what lower bounds exist for the optimal dierential privacy for the SVM?
Lower Bounding Optimal Differential Privacy
To lower bound β for any ( , δ)-useful mechanism, we rst establish a negative sensitivity result for the SVM, by constructing two neighboring databases on which SVM classiers dier.
Lemma 17. For any C > 0, n > 1 and 0 < < √ C 2n , there exists a pair of neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 on n entries, such that the functions f 1 , f 2 parametrized by SVM run with parameter C, linear kernel, and hinge loss on D 1 , D 2 respectively, satisfy
Proof. We construct the two databases on the line as follows. Let 0 < m < M be scalars to be chosen later.
Both databases share negative examples x 1 = . . . = x n/2 = −M and positive examples x n/2 +1 = . . . = x n−1 = M . Each database has x n = M − m, with y n = −1 for D 1 and y n = 1 for D 2 . In what follows we use subscripts to denote an example's parent database, so (x i,j , y i,j ) is the j th example from D i . Consider the result of running primal SVM on each database
Each optimization is strictly convex and unconstrained, so the optimizing w 1 , w 2 are characterized by the rst-order KKT conditions 0 ∈ ∂ w f i (w) for f i being the objective function for learning on D i , and ∂ w denoting the subdierential operator. Now for each i ∈ [2] is the subdierential of (x) + . Thus
The RHSs of these conditions correspond to decreasing piecewise-constant functions, and the conditions are met when the corresponding functions intersect with the diagonal y = x line, as shown in Figure 6 . If
, this implies
Theorem 18 (Lower bound on optimal dierential privacy for hinge loss SVM). For any C > 0, n > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1) and ∈ 0, 
. Then by the utility ofM ,
Then by Inequalities (6.1) and (6.2)
Thus there exists a t such that log
The same technique can be extended to prove a stronger lower bound. First we construct a set of N > 1 neighboring databases having SVM images that are a 2 -packing. To achieve this for any N we move from linear to RBF kernel.
Lemma 19. For any C > 0, n > C, 0 < < C 4n , and 0 < σ < 
Notice that the range space of γ is (0, 1). Since the inner-products and labels are database-independent, the SVM dual variables are also database-independent. Each involves solving
By symmetry α 1 = . . . = α n−1 , so we can reduce this to the equivalent program on two variables:
Consider rst the unconstrained program. In this case the necessary rst-order KKT condition is that
Since this solution is strictly positive, it follows that at most two (upper) constraints can be active. Thus four cases are possible: the solution lies in the interior of the feasible set, or one or both upper box-constraints hold with equality. Noting that 1
. This is equivalent to C ≥ 1 1−γ n > n, since γ ∈ (0, 1). This corresponds to under-regularization. If both constraints hold with equality we have α = C n 1, which is always feasible.
In the case where the rst constraint holds with equality α 1 = C n , the second dual variable is found by optimizing α 2 = max
. This solution is feasible provided 1 + Cγ
. Again this corresponds to under-regularization.
Finally in the case where the second constraint holds with equality α 2 = C n , the rst dual is found by optimizing α 2 = max
Cγ n (n−1) 2 . This is feasible provided
. Passing back to the program on n variables, by the invariance of the duals to the database, for any pair Notice that N ≥ 2 so the second term is in (1, e], while the rst term is in (0, 1). In summary we have shown that for any i = j and n > C we have that either case 2 or case 4 must hold. In both cases α n = C n
. Now for small x we can take the linear approximation sin x ≥
. Thus in this case
. This bound on σ in turn implies the following bound on γ: γ = exp − . So for small σ we can construct more databases leading to the desired separation.
Finally, N > 4 implies that we must constrain σ < 1 2 log e 2 . In summary, if n > C and σ < 1 2 log e 2
then for any i = j this implies f i − f j ∞ ≥ 2 as claimed.
Theorem 20 (Strong lower bound on optimal dierential privacy for hinge loss). For C > 0, n > C, δ ∈ (0, 1), ∈ 0, n 4C , and σ < 1 2 log e 2 the optimal dierential privacy for the hinge SVM with RBF kernel having parameter σ is lower-bounded by log e (1−δ) (N −1) δ , where N = 2 σ 2 log e 2 . That is, under these conditions, all mechanisms that are ( , δ)-useful wrt hinge SVM with RBF kernel for any σ do not achieve dierential privacy at any level.
Proof. Consider ( , δ)-useful mechanismM with respect to hinge SVM learning mechanism M with parameter C > 0 and RBF kernel with parameter 0 < σ < 
Then by Inequalities (6.3) and (6.4)
.
Note that n > C is a weak condition, since C should grow like √ n for universal consistency. Also note that this negative result is consistent with our upper bound on optimal dierential privacy: σ aects σ p , increasing the upper bounds as σ ↓ 0.
Conclusion & Open Problems
We have presented a pair of new mechanisms for private SVM learning. In each case we have established dierential privacy via the algorithmic stability of regularized empirical risk minimization. To achieve utility under innite-dimensional feature mappings, we perform regularized ERM in a random Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space whose kernel approximates the target RKHS kernel. This trick, borrowed from large-scale learning, permits the mechanism to privately respond with a nite representation of a maximum-margin hyperplane classier. We then established the high-probability, pointwise similarity between the resulting function and the SVM classier through a new smoothness result of regularized ERM with respect to perturbations of the RKHS. The bounds on dierential privacy and utility combine to upper bound the optimal dierential privacy of SVM learning for hinge-loss. This quantity is the optimal level of privacy among all mechanisms that are ( , δ)-useful with respect to the hinge-loss SVM. Finally, we derived a lower bound on this quantity which established that any mechanism that is too accurate with respect to the hinge SVM with RBF kernel, with any non-trivial probability, cannot be β-dierentially private for small β. An interesting open problem is to derive lower bounds holding for moderate to large . Another direction for future research is to extend our mechanisms to other kernel methods. Finally, a general connection between algorithmic stability and global sensitivity would immediately suggest a number of practical privacypreserving learning mechanisms. The main results were stated in terms of non-dierentiable convex loss functions so that they would hold for the hinge loss, however the proofs in the main text applied to dierentiable loss functions only. For completeness we now re-prove the appropriate lemma's for subdierentiable loss functions of which general convex loss functions are a special case.
In each case the proofs for subdierentiable loss are essentially identical to the dierentiable loss proofs:
we discuss only the arguments that change when generalizing to non-dierentiable loss functions. Previously ∂ w referred to the gradient operator, now it refers to the subdierential operator. The subscript reminds us that we are viewing the operand as a function of w only. Similarly other subscripts extend the notion of other partial derivatives. Previously there was a unique gradient at each point, now there may be many subgradients, making up the subdierential set at a point. As we are dealing with sets of subgradients, we use the shorthand that for sets S, T , vector v and scalar a that: S + T = {g + h | g ∈ S, h ∈ T }, aS = {ag | g ∈ S}, S +v = {g + v | g ∈ S}, S, v = { g, v | g ∈ S} and S ≥ T means g ≥ h for all (g, h) ∈ S ×T .
Lemma 21 generalizes Lemma 6 on the sensitivity of the SVM primal weight vector, to general (i.e., subdierentiable) convex loss functions.
Lemma 21. Consider loss function (y,ŷ) that is convex and L-Lipschitz inŷ, and RKHS H induced by nite F -dimensional feature mapping φ with bounded kernel k(x, x) ≤ κ Proof. For convenience we dene R emp (w, S) = n 
where the second equality follows from ∂ w (y, f w (x)) = (y, f w (x)) φ(x), where (y,ŷ) = ∂ŷ (y,ŷ), and x i = x i and y i = y i for each i ∈ [n − 1]. The inequality follows from the convexity of in its second argument.
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Combined with the existence of non-positive r ∈R(w D ) this yields that there exists g ∈
